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the area of economic and social welfare, the courts will uphold
the statute in the face of an equal protection claim so long as
there is a rational basis for the classification. Allocation of scarce
resources is a major concern for the state. "[For the] people
[who] are the most needy in the country... it is appropriate for
medical care costs to be met, first, for [those] people." 2 64
SUPREME COURT
ALBANY COUNTY
Augat v. Dowling 265
(decided May 20, 1994)
Petitioner, Robert Augat, claimed the conduct of respondent,
Commissioner of Social Services of the State of New York,
violated his liberty interest in reputation and employment, as well
as his constitutional right to due process under the New York 266
and Federal Constitution. 2 67 Specifically, petitioner claims that a
report was issued citing allegations of physical abuse by the
petitioner against a resident, and directing the revocation of his
approval to act as administrator for the Laurel Manor Home for
Adults. 26 8 Further, the petitioner was discharged from his
employment, denied an opportunity to challenge the accusations
against him, and was not permitted to be present at the home or
264. Schweiker, 457 U.S. at 590.

265. 161 Misc. 2d 225, 613 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1994).
266. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section 6 provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
267. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. . . ." Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1
provides in pertinent part: "No State shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law. . .. " Id.
268. Augat, 161 Misc. 2d at 226-27, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 528. Mrs. Agatha
Augat also claimed respondent's conduct violated her constitutional rights. Id.
at 226, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
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have any contact with the residents. 2 69 The respondent, in a
verified answer, took a threefold approach. 270 First, respondent
asserted that the petitioner lacked proper standing to challenge the
inspection report issued by the Department; 27 1 second,
respondent contended that the proceeding was premature; and
finally that the petitioner did not have a constitutionally protected
interest in retaining Department approval for his position as
administrator of the residential facility. 2 72
The Supreme Court of New York, Special Term, held that the
two directives in the Department's report were to be annulled, as
contrary to the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause,
and remanded the proceeding with the direction that petitioner
receive a hearing on the charge that he abused a facility
resident. 2 73
Having brought an article 78 proceeding, 274 petitioner
challenged the decision of the Commissioner of Social Services
who stated in his report that petitioner was "no longer approved
to act as administrator... "275 of the Laurel Manor Home for
Adults. 2 76 The respondent had inspected the facility and issued a
report containing its decision to essentially remove petitioner as
administrator. 2 77 The report stated that petitioner had allegedly
physically abused a resident, and expressed a disapproval of
269. Id.
270. Id. at 227, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 231, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
274. Id. at 226, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 528. "Petitioner Agatha Augat [at the
time of this opinion] is licensed by the respondent to operate the Laurel Manor
Home for Adults[,]... [t]he Augat Family has operated adult care facilities
since 1920... [and] Robert Augat became its administrator in 1982." Id.
Robert Augat is the petitioner who is challenging the revocation of his license
to act as adminitrator. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. The Laurel Manor Home for Adults, as explained by the court, is
"a residential facility for adults needing some assistance in performing the
routine functions of daily living." Id.
277. Id. "Pursuant to 18 N.Y. CoMP. CODE R. & REGS. tit. 18
§ 487.9(c)(2) [sic] a person cannot be an administrator of an adult home
'without prior written approval of the department."' Id.
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petitioner as administrator of the facility. 278 Petitioner
subsequently demanded a hearing on the charge of abuse which
was denied when the Department stated that he had no right to an
administrative hearing. 279 Petitioner asserted several causes of
80
action. First, he asserted a violation of his due process rights2
in that he was deprived of notice of the accusation, as well as an
administrative hearing. 2 81 Second, he claimed a violation of his
"constitutionally protected liberty interest in his reputation and
employment by the [Commissioner's] conduct." 282
The petitioner claims he was not given the chance to respond to
the charge of physical abuse because he was not allowed to attend
a meeting with the Social Services Regional Director. 2 83 His
inability to respond to the charge was also based upon the ground
that the Department was not specific in the charge or its
origin. 2 84 The affidavit further alleged that the Director charged
petitioner with being "burnt out" and that he had been drinking
prior to the meeting. 285 Petitioner claimed the "Department's
action ha[d] caused him to lose his employmentol
and.., resulted in physical ailments." 2 86 In opposition, the
278. Id. Violations 24 and 55 of the report state the contentions at issue
here. Id.
279. Id.
280. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
281. Augat, 161 Misc. 2d at 226, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
282. Id. As outlined by the court, petitioner had three other causes of
action:
The third cause of action asserts damage to a constitutionally protected
interest of Mrs. Augat. The fourth cause of action asserts a violation of
Mr. Augat's constitutional rights to freedom of speech, association, and
equal protection of the laws because of the direction that he is being
prohibited from engaging in any conversation or physical interaction
with the residents of Laurel Manor. The fifth cause of action asserts that
the respondent has overstepped its authority in attempting to restrict the
civil rights of Mr. Augat and the adult home residents with regard to
conduct taling place off the premises of the adult home.

Id. at 226-27, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
283. Id. at 227, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
284. Id. at 227, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 529.
285. Id.
286. Id.
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respondent claimed that "a full and fair opportunity to respond to
7
the charges!-" was provided. 28
The court addressed respondent's first contention, that
petitioner lacked standing to challenge the report in issue, with an
application of what the court viewed as the correct rule of law.
The court quoted Salla v. County of Monroe28 8 which stated "an
employee has standing to challenge the unconstitutional
interference of third persons with the employer-employee
relationship." 2 89 Petitioner was found to have made a prima facie
showing of the requisite unconstitutional interference and thus
had standing. 2 90
The Augat court, after resolving the issue of standing,
immediately turned to the respondent's major contention, that
petitioner did not have a property or liberty interest in the
Department's approval of him to act as administrator. 2 91 Stating
that the Commissioner and the Department were subject to the
State Administrative Procedure Act, 292 the court defined what a
license was according to the Act. 2 93 Next, the Augat court looked
to the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations which provides
that a person cannot be an adult home administrator "without
prior written approvyal of the Department." 2 94 As a result, the

287. Id.
288. 64 A.D.2d 437, 409 N.Y.S.2d 903 (4th Dep't 1978), aft'd, 48
N.Y.2d 514, 399 N.E.2d 909, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1979), cert. denied, 446

U.s. 909 (1980).
289. Augat, 161 Misc. 2d at 228, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 529 (quoting Salla, 64
A.D.2d 437, 409 N.Y.S.2d 903).
290. Id.

291. Id.
292. N.Y. A.P.A. LAW § 102(4) (McKinney 1984).

293. Augat, 161 Misc. 2d at 228, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 529. Section 102(4) of
the State Administrative Procedure Act defines license as follows: "'License'
includes the whole or part of any agency permit, certificate, approval,
registration, charter, or similar form of permission required by law." Id.
(citing N.Y. A.P.A. LAW § 102(4)).
294. Id. (citing N.Y. COMp. CODES P. & REGs. tit. 18, § 487.9(c)(2)
(1990)).
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court held that this approval, pursuant to the Act, 2 95 was clearly
96
a license. 2
The Augat court then proceeded to cite and explain several
New York cases that dealt with the effects of a license revocation
on a person's constitutional rights. The Augat court first cited to
Perpente v. Moss.297 In Moss, an applicant seeking a license to
run an employment agency was denied the license due to the fact
that he had been associated with an agency which had its license
revoked prior to this incident. 298 The denial had been based on
the applicant's character. 299 The applicant reapplied and again
was denied. 300 The appellate division sustained the denial,
holding that the Commissioner was within his rights to pass on
the applicant's character. 30 1 The court of appeals stated, in
language relied upon by the Augat court, that "a license may not
be refused on the ground that the applicant 'is not a person of
good character' unless the applicant has fair opportunity to meet a
challenge to his good character and unless the court, of review is
apprised of [its] basis . . "302 The Moss court subsequently
303
dismissed the applicant's appeal.
Next, the Augat court looked to O'Brien v. O'Brien.304 In
O'Brien, the court of appeals dealt with the equitable distribution
of marital property resulting from a divorce. The marital property
in question was the husband's license to practice medicine. 3 05
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

N.Y. A.P.A LAW § 102(4) (McKinney 1984).
Augat, 161 Misc. 2d at 228, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 529.
293 N.Y. 325, 56 N.E.2d 726 (1944).
Id. at 327, 56 N.E.2d at 726.
Id.

300. Id.

301. Perpente,267 A.D. 974, 48 N.Y.S.2d 548.
302. Moss, 293 N.Y. at 329, 56 N.E.2d at 727.
303. Id. at 330, 56 N.E.2d at 728.

304. 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
305. Id. at 580, 489 N.E.2d at 713, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 744. The appellate
division concluded that the license was not marital property subject to
distribution. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d 223, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548 (2d
Dep't 1985). See Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482 (2d
Dep't 1983); Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (4th
Dep't 1982).
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The license had been acquired during the marriage and with the
significant support of Dr. O'Brien's wife. 30 6 The court of
appeals held that the license was subject to distribution as marital
property3 07 and, as a part of its reasoning, the court stated, "[a]
professional license is a valuable property right... which may
not be revoked without due process of law." 308
Saunell v. New York Racing Ass'n, 3 0 9 was another case

illustrative of the relationship between license revocation and
constitutional rights. In Saunell, a jockey had been excluded
from racing at tracks owned by the New York Racing Association
[hereinafter NYRA], which was, in fact, a monopoly sanctioned
by the State Legislature. 3 10 The jockey had contended that

NYRA's action was, in effect, a revocation of his license without
a hearing. 3 11 The New York Court of Appeals held, without
referring to licenses specifically, that "it was a violation of
petitioner's constitutional rights to exclude him from NYRA
12
facilities without a prior hearing." 3
The Augat court summarily discussed several other cases
analogous to Saunzel1313 before proceeding to the final major case
306. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 581, 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
307. Id. at 588, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
308. Id. at 586, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
309. 58 N.Y.2d 231, 447 N.E.2d 706, 460 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1983).
310. Id. at 235, 447 N.E.2d at 708, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 765. The complainant
contended that the State Administrative Procedure Act applied to the NYRA
and thus he was entitled to a hearing. Id. The court of appeals determined that
the Act did not apply but did recognize state action as the State Legislature had
granted the monopoly. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 237, 447 N.E.2d at 709, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
313. See Wrona v. Donovan, 88 A.D.2d 998, 451 N.Y.S.2d 834 (2d Dep't
1982) (holding that where employee must carry a gun to perform his job, due
process requires a hearing on whether permit should be revoked); Caputo v.
Barber, 76 A.D.2d 1029, 429 N.Y.S.2d 76 (3d Dep't 1980) (holding that
baker received due process under Fourteenth Amendment when hearing was
granted on his food processing license and he was allowed to appear with
counsel); Rossetti v. O'Connell, 10 Misc. 2d 453, 172 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup.
Ct. New York County 1958) (holding that where a garbage collector's license
was revoked without notice or hearing, a property right was taken without due
process of law).
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3 14
used in support of its reasoning, Sedutto v. City of New York.
In Sedutto, a high pressure boiler engineer was denied a
license. 3 15 The City of New York argued, as respondents in
Augat did, that the engineer had a full and fair opportunity to
submit proof of his qualifications. Further, the City argued that
the administrative code did not require a hearing prior to the
denial of a license. 3 16 The crux of the City's argument was that
the question of the availability of a hearing, in a situation similar
to the one before the Augat court, was whether the license was
considered a privilege or a right. 3 17 The Sedutto court
acknowledged that the distinction between rights and privileges
had been rejected by the United States Supreme Court 3 18 and
pulled the linchpin from the City's argument. Subsequently, the
Sedutto court stated that "[i]n view.., of... [actions] taken by
the department without benefit of the right of confrontation to the
petitioner... the court concludes that the determination [to deny

the license] was arbitrary and capricious ...
19

and a due process

hearing is required." 3
The Augat court concluded with a list of occupations which,
under New York law, have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in their licenses. 320 Finding that the people in the
occupations listed would be entitled to notice and a hearing
before a revocation, the Augat court could not find any reason, as
contended by respondent, why the petitioner would not be
deserving of the same constitutional protection. 32 1 Finally, the
court stated that the respondent's conduct was exactly what the
"due process clause of the Constitution" aims to prevent, and
314. 106 Misc. 2d 304, 431 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct. New York County

1980).
315. Id. at 304, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
316. Id. at 308, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
317. Id.
318. See Board of Regents of State College v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
319. Sedutto, 106 Misc. 2d at 309-10, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
320. Augat, 161 Misc. 2d at 230, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 531. The list included:
"a doctor, a jockey, a baker, a payroll guard, a tow truck driver,.., a
garbage man, and a boiler engineer ...... Id.
321. Id. at 231, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
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held that under the circumstances, petitioner was entitled to an
adversarial hearing on the charge of physically abusing a resident
at the facility. 322
The constitutional rights, with regard to licenses, acknowledged
by Augat, Saumell, Sedutto, O'Brien, and Moss, have also been
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States. In cases
such as Barry v. Barchi323 and O'Bannon v. Town CourtNursing
Center, 324 the Supreme Court of the United States illustrated the
complexities involved when it has decided on the constitutional
rights involved with license revocations.
In Barchi, the New York State Racing and Wagering Board
[hereinafter NYSRWB] 325 set certain standards which essentially
suspended a trainer's license when a post-race drug test of a horse
revealed drugs. These standards were enacted against a horse
trainer and resulted in the suspension of his license. 326 The
trainer claimed his license was protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, the New
York statute, which authorized the standards, was void due to the
unavailability of a preliminary hearing to determine his
culpability. 327 NYSRWB maintained throughout that the trainer
was entitled to the process as provided by the statute. 3 28 The
Court held that the State had an "important interest in assuring
the integrity of the racing carried on under its auspices and thus,
an interim suspension was necessary to determine issues involved
in a case regarding such a State interest." 32 9 In words more
relative to Augat, the Court stated "it is clear that Barchi had a
property interest in his license sufficient to invoke the protection

322.
323.
324.
325.

Id.
443 U.S. 55 (1979).
447 U.S. 773 (1980).
Barchi, 443 U.S. at 57 n.1.

326. Id. at 59.
327. Id. at 61. Also stated as a basis was that "a summary suspension could
not be stayed pending the administrative review provided by the statute." Id.
328. Id. at 60.
329. Id. at 64.
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of the Due Process Clause... [and] [u]nquestionably, the
330
magnitude of [his] interest... is substantial."
Similarly, in O'Bannon, the United States Supreme Court
analyzed the implications of license revocation. In O'Bannon, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare [hereinafter
HEW] and the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare
[hereinafter DPW] revoked the Town Court Nursing Center's
authority to provide nursing care to elderly residents, at
government expense, in the form of reimbursements from HEW
and DPW. 33 1 These reimbursements were available to the
Nursing Center because it qualified as a "skilled nursing
facility."' 3 32 Subsequently, the Nursing Center was essentially
decertified and HEW and DPW discontinued their
reimbursements. 3 33 Residents of the Nursing Center brought suit
requesting a pre-termination hearing. 334 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit3 35 held, aside from other issues,
that the residents had a constitutionally protected interest in
continuing residence 33 6 at the facility which gave rise to their
right to a pre-termination hearing. 33 7 In reversing, the Supreme
Court stated, "while a patient has a right to continued benefits to
pay for care in the qualified institution of his choice, he has no
enforceable expectation of continued benefits to pay for care in
an institution that has been determined to be unqualified." ' 338
330. Id.

331. O'Bannon, 447 U.S. at 775-76. The "government expense" consisted
of reimbursements under "provider agreements" with HEW and DPW.
Reimbursements were paid to the Nursing Center for people who qualified for
Medicare and Medicaid under the Social Security Act. Id. at 775.
332. Id. at 775.
333. Id. at 775-76.
334. Id. at 777.
335. Town Court Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Beal, 586 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1978),
rev'd, 447 U.S. 773 (1980).
336. O'Bannon, 447 U.S. at 779. The argument was that the discontinuance
of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements would amount to the residents
being transferred to another facility that was qualified to receive such
reimbursements. Id. at 780.
337. Id. at 779.
338. Id. at 786.
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With that sentence the Court indicated that the patients were
enjoying an indirect benefit and thus their "constitutionally
protected interest in life, liberty, or property" was not directly
affected. 339
In comparing federal decisions such as Barchi and O'Bannon to
state decisions like Augat, Sawnell, and Sedutto, there is
agreement, whether outright or implicit, on the issue of.
constitutional rights and how those rights are treated under cases
where license revocation is involved. The United States Supreme
Court and the New York courts are consistent in that both require
that one must have an interest, such as petitioner's job, at stake.
Once it is determined that an interest is at stake, the safeguards of
due process protect against the deprivation of that interest.
Situations exist where a state interest may supersede certain
procedural rights, as in Barchi. Furthermore, although rights may
appear to exist in certain situations, these rights may not exist, as
in O'Bannon, because they are misinterpreted. The Augat court,
perhaps fortunately, did not encounter such complexities. If it
had, surely Supreme Court precedents would have been applied.
Finally, the recognition of due process rights and one's liberty
interest in holding a license appears to be applied consistently, in
federal courts dealing with Medicare and gambling issues and in
New York courts when dealing with jockeys, boiler engineers,
and administrators. Of course, the general rules applied in Augat
are subject to exceptions based upon the specific language of the
statutory licensing provisions.
NEW YORK COUNTY
340
Campo-v. New York City Employees' Retirement System
(printed April 26, 1994)

The plaintiff, Mrs. Campo, brought her due process claim into
New York State court 341 following the dismissal 342 and
339. Id. at 790.
340. N.Y. L.J, Apr. 27, 1994, at 22 (Sup. CL New York County 1994).
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